Pranav is a research analyst at a16z crypto. He does research on problems in mechanism design and algorithmic game theory as it relates to blockchain systems. He is especially focused on how incentives interact across the blockchain stack. Prior to a16z, Pranav was a student at Columbia University where he graduated with a degree in Computer Science.
Representative works include:
- “Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions” (with Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, and Xizhi Tan)
- “Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers” (with Maryam Bahrani and Tim Roughgarden)
- “PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents” (with Artem Baklanov, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Daniel Schoepflin)