Politics transformed? Electoral competition under ranked choice voting

Peter Buisseret (Harvard) compares multi-candidate elections under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). Candidates choose whether to conduct a broad campaign that can appeal to all voters, or instead pursue a targeted campaign that favors a narrow segment of voters. He examines a widely held presumption that RCV more effectively incentivizes candidates to campaign broadly, compared to plurality rule. He identifies conditions under which this presumption is true. However, he also unearths real-world relevant contexts in which the prediction reverses: when voters are divided by partisan, ethnic, geographic or cultural cleavages, the possibility of winning second preferences can intensify candidates’ incentives to pursue targeted campaigns.

About the presenter

Peter is an Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University. His research uses game theory to study electoral competition, legislative policymaking, and collective bargaining. His broader agenda focuses on how political institutions structure political and economic incentives, and how they can be improved.

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